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 A Fuhrer of Industry: 
Krupp Before, During and After Nuremberg 
 STANLEY A. GOLDMAN* 
If there is no judge and no judgment, then everything is arbitrary and 
Hitler, may his name perish, was right: force is the only law. Then 
it’s normal to play with the skulls of small children and to order a fa-
ther to dig a grave for himself and his family.1 
In the late nineteenth century, the long-established Krupp family of 
merchants and industrialists had already emerged as the primary arms 
provider to Bismarck’s Second Reich, and would continue as the coun-
try’s principal munitions supplier through the First World War. Not sur-
prisingly, during the 1930s the head of the family, Gustav Krupp devot-
ed a remarkable amount of time to strengthening his Nazi ties.2 The 
Third Reich’s leading capitalist and armaments producer, Gustav was 
named by Hitler as “Fuhrer of German Industry.”3 
It would be a profitable connection for Gustav. Even before War 
World II his family was to benefit “from the elimination of Jewish 
competition and the availability of valuable Jewish property at bargain 
prices.”4 As hostilities rapidly escalated, the company’s significance as 
well as its bottom line grew to previously unheard-of levels. 
 
*  Stanley A. Goldman, Professor of Law at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, and Direc-
tor, Center for the Study of Law and Genocide. Before joining the tenured faculty at Loyola, Stan 
Goldman spent eight years as a deputy Los Angeles County public defender. He has tried approx-
imately 70 jury and 300 court trials and has appeared as counsel in every level of federal and Cal-
ifornia court, including the California and United States Supreme Courts. He teaches Criminal 
Law, Criminal Procedure, Evidence and The Law and Genocide. In addition, he is a lecturer for 
the BARBRI bar review course, where he has taught Legal Ethics, Criminal Law, Criminal Pro-
cedure, Evidence, and Trusts and Wills, as well as Constitutional Law. He is the founder and di-
rector of the Loyola Center for the Study of Law and Genocide. 
Portions of this article will be appearing in Prof. Goldman’s upcoming book on the history of 
the Holocaust entitled: LEFT TO THE MERCY OF A RUDE STREAM: SURVIVING THE HOLOCAUST 
(forthcoming 2017). 
 1. ISAAC BASHEVIS SINGER, SHADOWS ON THE HUDSON 50 (1998). 
 2. Id. at 367–85. 
 3. WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE ARMS OF KRUPP 367 (Little & Brown eds., 1968). 
 4. Id. at 390. 
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While no single weapon accounted for the stunning successes of 
the 1939 blitzkrieg invasion of Poland or the 1940 conquests of France 
and Belgium, Krupp factories had fashioned an arsenal of remarkably 
sophisticated instruments of war that could not be matched in either pro-
ficiency or numbers by any military force in Europe.5 Their tanks were 
unparalleled for their size and mobility, as well as their sheer speed and 
striking power.6 William L. Shirer wrote that as the German assault be-
gan “lurching into the Ardennes Forest,” their Krupp tanks “‘stretched 
in three columns back for 100 miles far beyond the Rhine.’”7 
The company had become much more than just one of Nazi Ger-
many’s weapons suppliers. It was essential to the success of German 
aggression. As historian William Manchester noted in his classic work, 
The Arms of Krupp: 
Krupp’s assembly lines in his hundred factories turned out guns of 
all calibers—antiaircraft guns, antitank guns, and heavy naval 
guns—in addition to tank, submarine, and other warship and aircraft 
parts, and the steel used by other munitions producers. . . . To an ex-
tent unprecedented in the history of industry, a corporation had be-
come an integral part of a warlord’s apparatus.8 
Even by the beginning of the war, however, Gustav was beginning 
to slip into a form of senility and in the spring of 1942 he suffered a 
stroke.9 It would be physical problems and the advanced nature of his 
dementia that, a few years later, was to save the seemingly uncompre-
hending and all but voiceless Gustav from standing trial at Nuremberg. 
Allied prosecutors were to make a late decision to drop charges against 
him and attempt to substitute in his place the man who succeeded him 
as head of the family business: his eldest son Alfried Felix Alwyn 
Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach (known as Alfried Krupp).10 
Alfried had been the perfect successor to lead the family business 
into the new German War. He had provided “faithful assistance to the 
embattled S.S. in 1931,” when at twenty-four he positioned himself “in 
the vanguard of the movement”11 as a “sponsoring member.”12 His Nazi 
contacts give them the opportunity to acquire slaves for his factories and 
 
 5. Id. at 411. 
 6. Id. at 410–11. 
 7. Id. at 416. 
 8. Id. at 411–12. 
 9. BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, LESS THAN SLAVES: JEWISH FORCED LABOR AND THE QUEST 
FOR COMPENSATION 70 (Harvard Univ. Press 1979). 
 10. Id. at 71, accord MANCHESTER, supra note 3, at 631. 
 11. MANCHESTER, supra note 3, at 398. 
 12. Id. at 11, 597, 605, accord FERENCZ, supra note 9, at 70. 
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then to negotiate for government contracts that could only be accom-
plished by a company with such a limitless and cheap source of work-
ers. 
Though the judges of the International Military Tribunal (“IMT”) 
agreed to remove Gustav from a list which would eventually include the 
twenty-one most prominent living Nazis (including Hermann Goering 
and Albert Speer), they denied the prosecution’s late request to add Al-
fried to the catalog of defendants. Instead of being charged in the first 
and most famous of the Nuremberg trials, the younger Krupp would be 
tried two years later before one of the twelve subsequent Nuremberg 
Military Tribunals (“NMT”) where his guilt would be determined by 
three American judges. 
Hitler had not asked Krupp to exploit the Jews of Auschwitz; it 
was Alfried who voluntarily set his sights on taking financial advantage 
of the death camp’s labor force.13 William Manchester, the most widely 
known chronicler of the Krupp dynasty concludes that as a devoted Na-
tional Socialist in good standing, Alfried had “considered it [his] duty to 
make . . . Jewish girls, some of them little more than children, work un-
der the most brutal conditions in the heart of [his factory empire] in Es-
sen.”14 
It is not known who first uttered the phrase, Vernichtung durch 
Arbeit (“extermination through work”) but Alfried Krupp did propose 
the idea to his Fuhrer.15 Manchester writes that Alfried told his Fuhrer 
that “he could see no reason why [Jews, foreign saboteurs, anti-Nazi 
Germans, Gypsies, criminals, and antisocial elements] shouldn’t con-
tribute something to the Fatherland.  .  .  .  Properly driven, each could 
contribute a lifetime of work in the months before he was dispatched.”16 
It was an idea that Hitler readily accepted. Extermination through work 
and profit was a convenient partner for the Nazis. 
Though many of his files were intentionally destroyed before they 
could fall into Allied hands, enough still existed to track Alfried’s use of 
 
 13. Id. In June 1943 the first of the Jewish captives entered work sheds in Auschwitz con-
structed for Krupp’s use.  He had overcome opposition to his plan to build a plant producing au-
tomatic weapons parts within the camp itself and staffed with Jewish slave laborers forced to pro-
duce weapons for their persecutors. Id. at 490. The Auschwitz factory workers who had managed 
to survive the war would later describe that from this Krupp plant they had been able to see the 
three big chimneys of the crematorium. Id. at 5. Though this particular project in eventually 
proved to be less financially successful for the Krupp Corporation than his already existing facto-
ries, “it was not for lack of trying” on Alfried’s part. FERENCZ, supra note 9, at 88, 90. 
 14. MANCHESTER, supra note 3, at 10. 
 15. Id. at 489, accord FERENCZ, supra note 9, at 103. 
 16. Id. 
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slaves.17 The plan was to have two groups of forced laborers. One group 
typically included foreign civilians and prisoners of war who, though 
compelled to toil under harsh conditions, would be allowed to survive. 
The other group was even less fortunate. Comprised of prisoners taken 
from concentration and death camps, they existed under the threat of be-
ing murdered at any moment or literally worked to death. The dead 
were then to be replaced by others similarly procured and equally ex-
pendable.18 One of Alfried Krupp’s Nuremberg prosecutors, Benjamin 
B. Ferencz, described this second category of predominantly Jewish 
workers as “less than slaves.”19 Slaves would normally be considered 
property by their masters, and therefore valuable enough to be kept 
alive. That a few Jews, working in factories like those owned by the 
Krupp family, ultimately outlived the war was not merely unexpected; 
there is no reason to believe it was anything other than an unintended 
mistake. 
As his family’s factories grew dependent on forced workers, the 
number of those Krupp exploited grew geometric. It was Alfried who 
ran a corporation which used the inmates of 138 concentration camps in 
nearly one hundred factories across Germany, Poland, Austria, France, 
and Czechoslovakia in what was labeled Arbeitseinsatz der Haftlinge 
(Prisoner’s contribution). Working for him in these factories, as well as 
in the actual concentration camps themselves, were about one hundred 
thousand slaves20 made up of approximately seventy thousand foreign 
civilians, over twenty-three thousand prisoners of war and typically at 
any given moment about ten thousand Jewish workers. 
A senior Krupp doctor, who had visited many of the fenced-in 
compounds run by his employer, described in a report the treatment of 
the slave laborers he had seen: 
Conditions . . . were greatly overcrowded. . . . The diet was extreme-
ly inadequate. . . . Only bad meat, such as horse meat or meat that 
had been rejected by veterinarians as infected with tuberculosis 
germs, was passed out in these camps.  Clothing, too, was altogether 
inadequate. Foreigners from the east worked and slept in the same 
clothing in which they arrived. Normally all of them had to use their 
blankets as coats in cold and wet weather. Many had to walk to work 
 
 17. Id. at 450. 
 18. MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN 
AMERICA’S COURTS 60 (New York Univ. Press 2003).   
 19. FERENCZ, supra note 9, at xvii. 
 20. MANCHESTER, supra note 3, at 492–93.   
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barefoot, even in winter.21 
He concluded that “[t]uberculosis was particularly prevalent” and 
estimated its rate to be “four times the normal rate.”22 Though there is 
no way to determine during which of their various confinements the 
slave laborers contracted the disease. My mother, who spent most of the 
last nine months of the war as a forced laborer at a Krupp munitions 
factory in Berlin, was one of those who, at some point during the war, 
contracted the disease. Almost exactly half a century later, doctors at 
Cedars-Sinai Hospital in Los Angeles mistakenly diagnosed her as hav-
ing lung cancer when a doctor misinterpreted the ancient tuberculosis 
scars left on her lungs. 
Thanks in part to such cost-cutting strategies, the Krupp family 
amassed staggering wartime wealth. Manchester described the scope of 
this financial empire. 
Hitler’s conquests made Krupp the greatest mogul in the chronicles 
of world trade before the Nazi tide. . . . [He] ruled an economic co-
lossus sprawling across 12 nations, from the Ukraine to the Atlantic, 
from the North Sea to the Mediterranean and owned factories every-
where, a complex of shipyards in the Netherlands, and ore mines in 
Greece, Russia, France, the Sudeten lands, Norway, and Yugosla-
via.23 
Krupp was not alone amongst German industrialists claiming that 
they had little or no option but to accept the slave labor provided by the 
Nazis. The assertion was, however, an easily refuted lie. Documents 
submitted into evidence during the Nuremberg trials proved that Ger-
man manufacturers clearly had a choice as to whether or not to exploit 
prisoners.24 A few who chose not to use such workers continued to run 
their companies and even successfully compete for various government 
contracts (though perhaps not as profitably as they might have other-
wise). The same evidence also revealed, as Peter Hayes concludes in his 
book From Cooperation to Complicity in the Third Reich, that the ma-
jority had shown “little hesitation about making use of the system”25 and 
eagerly took full advantage of the grotesque opportunity by accepting 
cheap and plentiful forced workers of all ages.26 
 
 21. Id. at 453. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 429.  
 24. Id. at 649–50. 
 25. PETER HAYES, FROM COOPERATION TO COMPLICITY IN THE THIRD REICH: DEGUSSA IN 
THE THIRD REICH 271 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005); see also EHRLICH HERBERT, HITLER’S 
FOREIGN WORKERS 154 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1997). 
 26. MANCHESTER, supra note 3, at 5. 
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Approximately four hundred German companies could be de-
scribed as major users of slave labor gathered from concentration 
camps,27 with a number of companies even insisting that the SS con-
struct slave labor camps adjacent to their own factories.28 Over fifty 
used prisoners from Auschwitz.29 At least half of what are today’s top 
twenty German companies made use of some of the estimated eight mil-
lion to ten million Nazi era slave laborers.30 “Jews who were selected for 
labor rather than immediate execution at . . . Auschwitz . . . were [usual-
ly] treated like doomed sub-humans” at their new worksites writes 
Richard Breitman in The Architect of Genocide: Himmler and the Final 
Solution.31 Yet even in the contemptible company of these manufactur-
ers, the Krupps’ role stood out as beyond merely indefensible. 
Living conditions for Jews in most Krupp factories were typically 
primitive at best. While in some locales these inmates did live in sturdy 
buildings, in others they had to survive in heatless huts, old ruins, or 
under tents and some were even forced to sleep unprotected on open 
ground. In these latter cases, it is difficult not to recognize the goal of 
extermination through work.32 
Housing at the Neukolln factory proved far better than those nor-
mally provided. The Jewish prisoners lived in rooms that held between 
four and fourteen women who slept in double-decker bunks. Each of the 
three barracks was surrounded by barbed wire33 as a precaution against 
escape which was soon made unnecessary by the terrifying intensity of 
Allied bombings against Berlin depressing any thoughts of flight.34 
There were working toilets and showers with the surprising luxury of 
hot water.35 The women were each given a toothbrush and overalls af-
fixed with yellow stars of David, along with wooden shoes with socks 
to be worn during their ten to twelve hour day or night work shift.36 
Though they received only one factory-cooked meal a day, it was ap-
 
 27. BAZYLER, supra note 18, at 60. 
 28. GÖRAN ROSENBERG, A BRIEF STOP ON THE ROAD FROM AUSCHWITZ 104 (Other Press 
2015). 
 29. BAZYLER, supra note 18, at 60. 
 30. Id. at 59. 
 31. RICHARD BREITMAN, THE ARCHITECT OF GENOCIDE: HIMMLER AND THE FINAL 
SOLUTION 234. 
 32. MANCHESTER, supra note 3, at 495. 
 33. Id. at 496. 
 34. JUDITH AGASSI, JEWISH WOMEN PRISONERS OF RAVENSBRÜCK: WHO WERE THEY? 
160 (Oneworld 2007). 
 35. Id. at 159. 
 36. Id. at 159–160; see also testimony Bracha Fride and Malka Golir, YAD VASHEM 0.3–
5279 (1996). 
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parently the same food served to the paid German employees as well as 
the non-Jewish conscripted workers made up of Italian, French, Polish 
and some Russian war prisoners.37 Given the normal hierarchy of Ger-
man forced labor, had it been specifically Jewish workers requested and 
expected by the factory, less resources and poorer living conditions 
might have been allocated. 
Though the accommodations may have been better, the work re-
quired of some of the Jews in this Berlin plant could be arduous, painful 
and even dangerous. One of the women from Lodz, by way of Ausch-
witz, would years later recount that, 
It was impossible to do all that was demanded of us. I worked in a 
galvanizing section, dripping hot irons into cold water.  The sparks 
flew into my eyes and burned my hands.  It was terrible. . . . I can 
hardly believe that I’m still alive today. . . . The German civilian 
foreman of the Krupp Company kept rushing us and we were all so 
terrified that if we stopped or slowed down we would be put in [a] 
crematorium that we worked to the last ounce of our strength. I en-
dured this for nine months. . . . When I think of the time I had to 
work for Krupp it seems like another world.38 
It is a testament to how nightmarish was the standard treatment of 
Jews that even these horrible conditions were better than those experi-
enced in most SS-run work camps. In Neukolln, Jews were neither mur-
dered nor beaten. Though once fall and winter came they possessed nei-
ther enough clothing nor food to properly cope with the elements or the 
work, none of the Jewish women perished from cold or starvation as in 
a number of other factories.39 In fact, the women lucky enough to have 
been assigned to building mechanisms or creating molds, rather than the 
dangerous and exhausting work of galvanizing, understood how much 
worse their lives might have been. 
At this stage of the war, given the absence of an adequate alterna-
tive source,40 it was logical to prevent the loss of even Jewish workers or 
else risk being unable to satisfy quotas.41 Many SS factory supervisors 
must have recognized the significance of a potential labor shortfall but 
their deeply rooted anti-Semitism, or the fear of upsetting their SS hier-
archy, may have trumped production concerns and they continued to 
treat their Jewish workers as easily expendable. Harsh mistreatment of 
 
 37. AGASSI, supra note 34, 159; see also testimony of Dvora Lezerkeritz, YAD VASHEM 
0.3–6889 (1996). 
 38. FERENCZ, supra note 9, at 93–94. 
 39. AGASSI, supra note 34, at 160; see also FERENCZ, supra note 9, at 101. 
 40. See id. at 157–60, 217. 
 41. See id. 
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Jewish women at Krupp labor camps remained the norm and compas-
sion the rare exception.42 
It was typical for Krupp factories to ask the concentration camps to 
supply them with foreign women in lots of approximately five hundred 
and on the same day my mother’s group was being transported to Neu-
kolln in Berlin, another group of five hundred young Jewish women had 
been sent from Auschwitz to the Krupp plant at Essen in the Ruhr.43 The 
masterful Krupp chronicler William Manchester describes that these 
Jewesses .  .  .  first marched past Humboldtstrasse’s new watchtow-
ers on August 25, 1944. . . . By all accounts [the Lagerfuhrer Oskar] 
Rieck seems to have stepped straight from a wartime B-movie. Short, 
scar-faced, and jackbooted, he always carried a rubber hose in one 
hand and a long leather whip in the other. If this description were 
based solely on the recollections of his victims, one might wonder, 
but it is supported in every detail by the commandant’s staff [who 
confirmed the prisoner’s characterization].44 
Most of the Jewish women working for them were between four-
teen and twenty-five, but there was one who was in her thirties. When 
she proved unable to keep up her younger coworkers Rieck whipped her 
to death.45 
With the arrival of the five hundred Jewish women at the Berlin-
Neukolln Krupp factory in late August 1944 came a warning from the 
guards who delivered them that their prisoners had better be watched 
carefully because they were criminals. As they marched onto the factory 
grounds, some German employees could be heard shouting “Murder-
ers!” It was not long, however, before the supervisors began to doubt 
that there was anything dangerous about their new workers. The young 
women, almost all of whom were under twenty-five,46 looked and acted 
like traumatized victims not evil perpetrators.47 
THE FALL AND RISE AND FALL 
OF THE 
UNREPENTANT ALFRIED KRUPP 
On April 11, 1945, as the advancing Allied Army captured the 
German town of Essen, “a squad of steel-helmeted American infantry-
 
 42. Compare AGASSI, supra note 34, at 160–164, with MANCHESTER, supra note 3, at 555. 
 43. See MANCHESTER, supra note 3, at 555; see also FERENCZ, supra note 9, at 94–95.  
 44. MANCHESTER, supra note 3, at 554. 
 45. Id.  
 46. See testimony of Bracha Fride and Malka Golir, YAD VASHEM 0.3–5279 (1996). 
 47. See AGASSI, supra note 34, at 161.  
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men” found Alfried Krupp in the office of his enormous mansion, still 
carrying on business as usual for the benefit of his Fuhrer and the 
Reich.48 When placed under house arrest he blithely assumed it would 
be for no more than a few days.49 His captors inquired why, though he 
must have received reports of the approaching Allied soldiers, he had 
not chosen to flee the Ruhr Valley?  He simply responded, “I wanted to 
stay with my factory, where I belong.”50 
At Nuremberg, Krupp’s attorneys argued (as did the lawyers for 
other manufacturers) that if their client had not accepted slave laborers 
or had he failed to meet the required quotas of munitions, he would 
have been punished.51 To rebut such claims, the prosecution offered tes-
timony from Karl Otto Saur, the former chief of Albert Speer’s minis-
try’s technical office.52 
A prisoner of the Allies from 1945 to 1948, Saur had been granted 
immunity in exchange for his cooperation at Nuremberg. 
[H]is appearance out of the past . . . stunned the thirty-three German 
lawyers sitting before Alfried like a protective black shield. They 
were helpless against Saur. He had been too close to the Fuhrer, he 
knew too much and he swore under oath that Alfried’s personal in-
tervention with Hitler was directly responsible for Krupp’s use of 
Auschwitz Jews.53 
Saur, who would be ostracized in post-war Germany for his candor 
which was considered by many Germans as tantamount to treason, testi-
fied that “[he had] not been able to find a single case, nor [had he] heard 
of a single one, in which someone was sent to a concentration camp be-
cause he failed to fulfill his production quota.”54 In addition, he noted 
that “[t]he relationship between Krupp and ourselves was different from 
our relationship with other firms.”55 If no one else had ever suffered 
physical punishment for not meeting expectations, the powerful Krupp, 
with his long and early ties as a member of the National Socialist hier-
archy, would certainly not have been the first. 
The Nuremberg court’s 1948, sixty thousand word written opinion 
found him guilty of, among other crimes, the use of slave laborers like 
 
 48. FERENCZ, supra note 9, at 70; MANCHESTER, supra note 3, at 11, 597, 605. 
 49. MANCHESTER, supra note 3, at 608. 
 50. Id. at 606. 
 51. Id. at 486. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 649–650. 
 54. Id. at 486. 
 55. MANCHESTER, supra note 3, at 451. 
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my mother.56 He continued to as show little emotion when he was sen-
tenced to twelve years in prison as he had during the course of his 
lengthy trial. However, when the tribunal pronounced the unexpected 
order that his corporate assets, the significant bulk of his fortune, were 
to be forfeited—a sanction not even the prosecution had requested—”he 
went as white as a sheet [and] seemed to be on the point of collapse.”57 
Like so many of those convicted at Nuremberg, however, Krupp 
would not serve anything approaching his pronounced sentence. A 
book, quickly authored by two of his attorneys along with the former 
National Socialist constitutional lawyer Ernest Rudolf Huber and enti-
tled “Why Was Krupp Condemned?,” convinced German Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer, as well as a large segment of the already sympathetic 
German public, that Alfried had been wrongfully convicted.58 
Though only a handful of years had passed since the gas chambers 
had ceased and the killing camps closed, they were already being 
thought of as remnants of an aberrant time. Acting as if half a dozen 
years were an epoch, the unpleasant subject of the Shoah appeared less 
and less as a topic of public discussion in the United States as well as 
Germany. 
This optimism and short-term memory was promoted by Western 
governments’ opportunistic efforts to align public opinion with what 
they saw as the new world order. A strong West German democracy 
was deemed vital to confront the Soviets. Obsessing about the Nazi 
atrocities of the last decade only succeeded in stirring up anti-German 
feeling at an awkward time when Germany was becoming an important 
new partner.59 
Britain and the United States, in particular, wanted the industrial 
potency of the coal and factories of the Ruhr Valley to reinvigorate their 
new ally, and the heart of the Ruhr Valley’s industrial strength had long 
been the Krupp works at Essen. With its surviving population of skilled 
workmen, engineers and supervisors, Krupp’s company still possessed 
the potential of an enormous economic engine.60 
Even some American newspapers, like the New York Herald Trib-
une, had questioned whether it was irresponsible to continue punishing 
 
 56. Id. at 657; see also United States v. Krupp, IX TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNAL UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 1327–1449 (U.S. 
Gov’t Printing Office Oct. 1946–Apr. 1949) (Judgement); FERENCZ, supra note 9, at 71. 
 57. Id.  
 58. HAROLD JAMES, KRUPP: A HISTORY OF THE LEGENDARY GERMAN FIRM 229 (Princeton 
Univ. Press 2012). 
 59. Id. at 84, 168, 85. 
 60. MANCHESTER, supra note 3, at 662.  
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a German industrialist like Alfried Krupp at a time when the United 
States should be rebuilding a democratic West Germany as a bulwark 
against Communist aggression.61 Some in the United States government 
were actually eager to see various convicted Nazi war criminals com-
pletely pardoned, so that their prior crimes would no longer follow 
them. This would prove a bridge too far even for United States High 
Commissioner and former Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, 
who was, however, willing to go so far as to accelerate release if not 
exoneration. McCloy was a veteran of issues surrounding the Holocaust. 
When in the second half of 1944 the War Department was considering 
various proposals to either bomb Auschwitz or the railway lines leading 
to it, it was McCloy who, rightly or wrongly, had rejected all such ideas 
as either impractical or unlikely to succeed.62 
On February 3, 1951, Alfried, along with all other imprisoned 
German industrialists, was officially pardoned and released by the 
American High Commissioner John McCloy. A former Wall Street at-
torney and named partner in the powerful firm of Milbank, Tweed, Had-
ley and McCoy, the he viewed the businessmen who had been the bene-
ficiaries of Nazi slave labor as having been in a category quite separate 
from the others convicted at Nuremberg. Ignoring that those found 
guilty had requested concentration camp inmates as forced workers, 
McCloy’s clemency board blithely and erroneously declared that the 
slaves had been assigned to the companies by the Nazi government and 
had remained under strict Gestapo control.63 In addition, personally be-
lieving that “property forfeiture was somehow repugnant to American 
justice,” McCloy ordered returned to Krupp the vast holdings that the 
Nuremberg tribunal had forced him to surrender.64 
Such forgiveness and leniency was not universally cheered. Wil-
liam Manchester noted that “[n]o single act of the occupation created a 
greater emotional shock than did McCloy’s rejection of the Krupp ver-
dict.”65 The 1951 French and British press vilified the premature freeing 
from prison and repossession of the Krupp fortune.66 New York liberal 
Republican Congressman Jacob Javits unsuccessfully protested to the 
new Secretary of State Dean Acheson. On the other hand, ultracon-
servative anti-Communist Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy called 
 
 61. Id. at 642. 
 62. Geoffrey Ward, Roosevelt in Auschwitz, WALL STREET JOURNAL (September 18, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/roosevelt-and-auschwitz-1442609477. 
 63. FERENCZ, supra note 9, at 74. 
 64. Id.; see also, MANCHESTER, supra note 3, at 680. 
 65. MANCHESTER, supra note 3, at 680; accord FERENCZ, supra note 9, at 75. 
 66. MANCHESTER, supra note 3, at 681. 
GOLDMAN MACRO FINAL (CS).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/16/17  6:29 PM 
198 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 39:187 
it an “extremely wise” decision in the ongoing war against the expan-
sionist Soviet Union.67 
None of the prosecutors, who had tried him, or the judges who had 
found him guilty, or the slaves who had toiled in his factories was con-
sulted before his release and the restoration of his financial empire. No 
alleged trial errors, which were claimed as the justification for the am-
nesty, were ever identified.68 The trial records seem never to have even 
been examined by those entrusted with making, what proved to be, a 
political decision to commute the sentences of Krupp and a score of 
other convicted Nazis granted early release. 
It was not the first time John McCloy had been seemingly indiffer-
ent to those involuntarily confined during time of war because of their 
ethnicity or national origin. As Assistant Secretary of War in the Roo-
sevelt administration—the official most responsible for the wartime 
treatment of Japanese Americans69—he had been a strong proponent of 
internment as a military necessity70 and had even attempted to bury a re-
port contradicting this hard-liner position.71 He would testify years later, 
that having personally inspected all of the American camps, that the in-
ternment had been in “the best interest of the country” and that “[o]n the 
whole [the] concentration of the Japanese population and its redistribu-
tion throughout the country resulted in their finding a healthier and 
more advantageous environment.”72 It seems rather doubtful that many 
of those of Japanese ancestry held for years behind the barbed wire 
would have agreed. 
Neither should it have been surprising that American High Com-
missioner McCloy would mischaracterize the work of the three Ameri-
can judges who had convicted and sentenced the German industrialists. 
McCloy had already done worse. In 1944, as the United States Supreme 
Court prepared to hear argument in Korematsu vs. United States, the 
most crucial and eventually notorious of the Japanese internment cases, 
it was McCloy who successfully held off Interior Secretary Ickes and 
others in the administration who wanted to concede the absence of any 
evidence of American-Japanese espionage.73 Associate Justice Stanley 
Reed, who would join the majority opinion declaring the internment 
 
 67. Id. at 673. 
 68. Id. at 682. 
 69. PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR:  THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN JAPANESE 
INTERNMENT CASES 15 (Univ. of California press 1983). 
 70. Id. at 195. 
 71. Id. at 209. 
 72. Id. at 352. 
 73. Id. at 344, 302. 
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constitutional, would later declare that the government’s claim that 
there had actually been instances of such dangerous and treasonous 
conduct by Americans of Japanese ancestry was vital to his difficult de-
cision.74 It is fitting that the most remembered and honored opinion ever 
authored by the illustrious Associate Justice and former lead Nuremberg 
prosecutor, Robert Jackson, is his timeless dissent in Korematsu. 
On November 3, 1981, before a blue-ribbon federal commission 
re-examining the internment, the eighty-six-year-old McCloy attested, 
and later attempted to retract, that the World War II confinement of Jap-
anese Americans had been an appropriate form of “retribution for the 
attack that was made on Pearl Harbor.”75 This from the man who had 
prematurely ordered the release of convicted Nazi war criminals and re-
turned to Krupp his family’s fortune. 
Having been reinstated as the head of his conglomerate by 
McCloy, Alfried Krupp would become the German public’s most popu-
lar industrialist. He appeared on the August 19, 1957 cover of Time 
magazine—not as part of an expose on the exploitation of wartime slave 
labor, or because of the murders he had ordered, the thefts he had perpe-
trated or his mass-produced weapons which had played a significant 
role in Hitler’s wartime successes. Rather, the publication hailed Krupp, 
“the wealthiest man in Europe—and perhaps the world,” as the symbol 
of the economic miracle that was postwar Germany.76 As the 1950s ap-
proached its end, he was about to become Europe’s only billionaire. 
In the late 1950s, four decades before the better-known and more 
all-encompassing slave labor German reparations cases of the late 
1990s, a legal brief entitled “The Forced Labor of Jewish Concentration 
Camp Inmates within the Krupp Combine,” authored by the Conference 
on Jewish War Claims (the “Conference”) arrived at the Krupp Corpo-
ration. It was a request, or demand, that the company provide a financial 
settlement to Jews who had been made to toil in Krupp’s wartime facto-
ries.77 The document included the following allegations: “The firm of 
Krupp exploited the prisoners’ labor without ever paying them for it, 
nor did it ever attempt to compensate its forced laborers for the injuries 
to life, health, freedom, and honor which were sustained.”78 
The corporation’s representatives were adamant that any discus-
sions of settlement could not involve any possibility of payments to the 
 
 74. Id. at 356 
 75. IRONS, supra note 69, at 353. 
 76. FERENCZ, supra note 9, at 76. 
 77. MANCHESTER, supra note 3, at 793. 
 78. Id. at 790. 
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heirs of already deceased Jews, nor would they consider making any 
charitable contributions on their behalf.79 Only if the “Conference” was 
prepared to accept this limitation would the corporation negotiate the 
claim. In other words, in order for talks to begin, the plaintiffs would 
have to agree that there would be neither debt, nor justice, for the dead.80 
Furthermore, perhaps fearing that it could involve tens of millions 
of dollars in additional payouts, the company took the position that the 
Conference on Jewish War Claims was not empowered to negotiate on 
behalf of potential Gentile, as opposed to Jewish, plaintiffs. This refusal 
to allow the conference to negotiate payments to anyone other than Jews 
was contrary to the position taken by the Farben Corporation which had 
recently reached a settlement agreement with the Conference. Farben 
was a major German company which had also used slave labor, as well 
as having operated a plant near Auschwitz Birkenau.81 
Plaintiff’s pro bono counsel Benjamin Ferencz, who had been the 
youngest of the Nuremberg lead prosecutors and a trial counsel against 
Krupp himself, was appalled by the pre-negotiation restrictions de-
manded by the Corporation. He was particularly sympathetic to the ar-
gument that former subjugated Jews and Gentiles should remain unified 
whenever possible. Ferencz, however, sadly concluded that Krupp (still 
apparently believing Jews to be a discrete and insular people separate 
from the rest of the world) would never make payments to non-Jewish 
victims based upon a claim asserted by a Jewish organization. In the end 
he agreed to the company’s demands. In exchange for the plaintiff’s 
limiting their claimants by not including deceased Jews or any Gentiles, 
the corporation agreed to begin negotiations. 
The Conference on Jewish War Material Claims’ attorneys pro-
posed payment of $1,250 to each living Jewish survivor. At first 
Ferencz optimistically believed that this modest request would lead to a 
quick settlement. Farben had reached an earlier agreement with the 
Claims Conference for the same $1,250 per survivor. In addition, Krupp 
had previously been quite generous when making retroactive compensa-
tion to his former German employees. In 1953, once he had felt secure 
at the head of his family business again, he sold off some of his land in 
order to make good on back payments owed to the company’s pension-
ers.82 
Ferencz, however, had not appreciated that the very thought of 
 
 79. Id. at 791. 
 80. BAZYLER, supra note 18, at 60.  
 81. Id. 
 82. PETER BATTY, THE HOUSE OF KRUPP 224 (Stein & Day 1967). 
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compensation to the non-German forced laborers, even in such a mini-
mal sum, was abhorrent to Krupp. Alfried had spent much of the 1950s 
continuing to deny that he had done anything wrong, while conveniently 
eliminating the visible evidence and reminders of his crimes. As histori-
an Peter Batty observes: “One by one, Krupp bulldozers leveled most of 
Alfried’s wartime concentration camps for new housing developments, 
and no one talked about the Jews anymore, partly because there were so 
few to attract attention.”83 
By 1957, he had demolished the facility and barracks at Neukolln 
where my mother’s group had labored for him. 
Negotiations were fierce and unpleasant. “Each session was 
marred by recriminations, accusations of bad faith” and even with what 
the Jewish representatives described as “anti-Semitic remarks” from the 
corporation’s representatives, Ferencz later wrote.84 
Krupp’s claim that he had never been responsible for the treatment 
of his former slave laborers was not merely legally inaccurate—it defied 
logic. His 1951 release from confinement had not absolved him of re-
sponsibility for criminal convictions involving the use of slave labor 
and his treatment of the slaves. It had been proven in court that he had 
signed detailed contracts giving the SS the authority to supervise and 
inflict punishment on the forced laborers in his enterprises, and he had 
admitted in affidavits to having, on several occasions, personally in-
spected the clearly abused and exploited slaves at a number of his facto-
ries. It was at his insistence, and over the protests of other Nazis, that a 
munitions plant be constructed in Auschwitz itself, and it had been on 
his personal orders that his foreman entered Auschwitz to select labor-
ers fit to work as those rejected were consigned to die in the gas cham-
bers. As with any other criminal defendant adjudged guilty, there was 
no legal reason preventing his victims from suing him civilly. 
As settlement discussions dragged on, the plaintiffs were consider-
ing the unprecedented step of filing suit in the New York Supreme 
Court where they would seek $100,000 on behalf of each of the forced 
laborers. Even John McCloy, to whom Krupp owed his early release 
and the return of his fortune, intervened to suggest that a settlement 
would be a wise business decision.85 McCloy and Krupp had remained 
in close contact, with Alfried apparently having grown to view the older 
American as something of a mentor.86 Yet even this counsel, as well as 
 
 83. MANCHESTER, supra note 3, at 871. 
 84. Id. at 793. 
 85. FERENCZ, supra note 9, at 81–82; see also JAMES, supra note 58, at 244. 
 86. MANCHESTER, supra note 3, at 834. 
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the prospect of a lawsuit filed in American courts, was not enough to 
persuade Europe’s richest industrialist to settle.87 
There was at that moment, however, one additional bit of outside 
pressure that lead the Corporation to finally compromise with its Jewish 
adversaries. In spite of it having been one of the brokered conditions for 
his original prison release and the return of his property, Alfried still 
hoped to avoid having to divest his corporation of its Nazi-sanctioned 
monopolistic holdings. Dredging up his past crimes might delay or even 
interfere with what would eventually prove to be his successful cam-
paign to maintain his existing industrial monopolies. Krupp grudgingly 
agreed that he would consider making some payment to each of his sur-
viving Jewish laborers. 
Given the Conference’s original request of $1,250 per survivor, 
approximately $2.5 million would have been sufficient to satisfy the 
modest demand for what they estimated would be approximately two 
thousand Jewish survivors.88 The corporation, on the other hand, assert-
ed that only about one thousand two hundred of their former Jewish la-
borers were likely still alive. The intentional destruction of the compa-
ny’s business records as the war approached its end, however, had made 
an accurate count of exactly how many Jews had gone into his labor 
camps difficult to determine. Calculating how many had actually sur-
vived to the time of the settlement appears to have been nothing more 
than educated guess work by both parties. 
McCloy arranged a meeting between the parties in the midtown 
New York offices of Chase Manhattan Bank. As a product of those talks 
it was announced on December 23, 1959, that the Corporation had 
agreed that one thousand two hundred (the Corporation’s estimate of the 
number of surviving Jewish former Krupp slaves) multiplied by just un-
der $1,200 (for a total close to $1.5 million) would be immediately pro-
vided in compensation.89 The corporation’s representatives also stated 
that an additional nearly $1 million would be set aside in what in the un-
likely event that their predicted number of survivors proved to be an 
underestimation.90 The understanding reached between the parties in-
cluded acceptance by the would be plaintiffs that the total would not ex-
ceed the promised ten million Deutschmarks ($2,380,000) and that by 
agreeing to such payment the potential civil defendant was not admit-
 
 87. FERENCZ, supra note 9, at 84. 
 88. Id. at 79–80. 
 89. Id. at 86. 
 90. MANCHESTER, supra note 3, at 791. 
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ting liability or responsibility for any alleged past misconduct.91 
Insightful members of the news media were not fooled by the set-
tlement’s rejection of legal responsibility or the company’s press releas-
es which alleged the payment was a voluntary contribution made in or-
der to “heal the wounds suffered during World War II.”92 The London 
Sunday Dispatch found this claim to been “mean-spirited and tawdry.”93 
They described it as “the most grasping, clutching, derisory ‘gift’ in re-
cent memory” and reminded its readers that Krupp had produced war-
time profits on “the blood and misery and starvation of . . . Jewish 
slaves who worked for him during the war.”94 
For Krupp’s refusal to agree to a larger payout, a Labour Party 
member of Briton’s Parliament called Alfried a “rascal [who] got away 
with murder and is now getting away with the swag.”95 However, when 
the meager extent of the final settlement was raised on the floor of the 
British Parliament, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ex-
plained that while his government was sympathetic to the ill-treatment 
of the survivors who had not been compensated, Britain would not be-
come involved.96 
Alfried not only seems to have been little affected by the negative 
foreign comments, he appears to have also been confident that he would 
never have to provide the additional $1 million yet to be deposited with 
the Conference.97 In the last months of the War, Krupp’s own squads 
had dispatched boxcar after boxcar of his Jewish workers to various 
death camps.98 It would have seemed unlikely to him that one thousand 
two hundred Jews, no less two thousand, had outlived both their captiv-
ity in his factories and the likely death sentence inherent in those spring 
1945 transports to extermination camps,99 as well as having had the 
good fortune not to have perished in the ensuing fifteen years. 
To his disappointment, Krupp lacked an adequate understanding of 
three facts: 
First, in the waning weeks of the war, extermination facilities such 
as Ravensbruck were no longer functioning efficiently. The commander 
at Buchenwald, for example, had refused to accept delivery of any addi-
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 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
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tional Jews since by the spring of 1945 his underlings no longer at time 
to murder all those already in their confinement. Thus, more Jews than 
Alfried had assumed outlived his death camp deliveries.100 
Second, assuming he knew of their existence, Krupp may have 
failed to consider the nearly five hundred women in my mother’s group. 
Mistakenly sent from Auschwitz to Berlin instead of the non-Jewish 
workers factory they had requested, they were apparently been provided 
with living conditions and sustenance normally afforded Gentiles forced 
laborers, but not Jews. As a result, 493 of the original five hundred Jew-
ish women sent to the Krupp factory in Berlin in August 1944 survived 
the war. It was the highest survival rate of any Jewish group shipped 
from Auschwitz to an SS controlled labor camp101 and they were now 
filing claims for reparations. In fact, the man who had built a wartime 
fortune in part on a business plan that depended on working Jewish 
slaves to death would eventually be outlived by most of the Jewish 
women who had toiled at his munitions factory near Berlin. 
Third, Alfried was correct if he believed that wartime deprivations 
would have likely shortened the longevity of some survivors. When in-
terviewed by Ferencz at his New York office, former Jewish slave 
workers all described suffering from chronic insomnia, and would often 
“burst into tears” when describing their lives under Krupp.102 The Jewish 
claimants from his factory at Essen, who were almost all in their late 
thirties and early forties at the time of the settlement, prematurely suf-
fered from ailments which would normally have not appeared until old 
age. One report concluded that by the 1970s, nearly two thirds of the 
Jewish survivors of Essen had passed away; but, in 1960, most of these 
former slaves were still alive and eager to file for even a minimal 
amount of their long overdue compensation.103 
In the end, more than seven thousand concentration camp inmates 
applied for the funds.104 The vast majority would be disappointed. Prov-
ing that they had worked for Krupp was difficult for some. As a result 
of incomplete records, only a small percentage of those claiming to 
have worked in Krupp factories such as the one at Reichenbach were 
ever able to establish their eligibility.105 On the other hand, about seven-
ty-five percent of the Jewish women who had survived slave labor at 
 
 100. Id. at 792. 
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plants in Neukolln, Essen and a factory at Geisenheim qualified for 
compensation.106 
Each of the first applicants deemed eligible (including my mother) 
were sent $750, with a few receiving as much as $825, and were told 
that more money would hopefully follow. However, in spite of no fees 
being charged by the Conference or its attorneys, it soon became clear 
that just under $1.5 million (the amount the Krupp Corporation had al-
ready turned over to the Conference) would not be enough to pay each 
of the Jewish survivors the $1,200 initially announced. 
As more Jewish survivors came forward and their claims validated, 
each initial payment was temporarily reduced to $500 to insure that all 
of them would be provided some compensation. As the number of 
claimants approved approached the plaintiff’s original estimate of two 
thousand, the funds dwindled away and payments had to be stopped un-
til receipt of the anticipated additional $1 million promised by the Cor-
poration.107 “Claimants could not understand why some of their com-
rades had been paid while others were told to wait.”108 
As the reserves were running out, the plaintiffs’ attorneys first 
learned that Krupp would not be contributing the additional money his 
representatives had promised.109 The Corporation’s top representative, 
who maintained that the original agreement had been merely a gratui-
tous promise and not a legally binding settlement, not only denied that 
the agreement had provided for these funds, he argued that the request 
itself was precluded by the settlement’s financial limits.110 The Corpora-
tion’s spokesperson announced, “we do not see ourselves in the position 
to make further sums available. I therefore do not consider even a dis-
cussion of this matter as appropriate.”111 Krupp believed that he had al-
ready been made to unjustly suffer enough. Having weathered the worst 
of the criticism as to the paltry nature of the reparations, as far as he was 
concerned giving away more money was unlikely to benefit his busi-
ness. 
When confronted with the question of why, if he were not guilty 
and bore no responsibility, he had paid the one and a half million dollars 
in seeming reparations, his representatives continued to claim the pay-
ments had simply been a voluntary “sacrifice” made in hopes of healing 
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old wounds.112 The German populace proved receptive to their popular 
job creator’s explanation. What could and should have been disastrous 
publicity was, at least in Germany, successfully converted into a public 
relations success.113 
When in the course of a personal correspondence with Benjamin 
Fenencz in January 2015, I mentioned that my mother had been a bene-
ficiary of his late 1959 settlement negotiations, the still angry ninety-
five-year-old responded, “I am honored and pleased that your mother 
was one of the recipients of the meager sums we managed to squeeze 
out of the Krupp criminals.” 
Adding insult to the irreparable injury he had caused, when con-
fronted in 1960 by requests from surviving non-Jewish slave laborers 
for belated compensation, Krupp responded that he was “unfortunately” 
unable to provide them with even a token amount. His excuse, in spite 
of the entire settlement having cost him a mere one-fifth of one percent 
of his family’s fortune,114 was that since “so much money has been used 
to the advantage of the Jews, we are not in a position to make voluntary 
contributions.”115 
In the National Socialist tradition, the explanation of the richest 
man in Europe to the Gentiles he had forced into the wretched condi-
tions of his slave labor camps was that they were now to receive no 
compensation because the Jews had taken all the money for them-
selves.116 The founders of the SS might have paid ready homage to their 
old friend’s logic. The strategy achieved even more than what it may 
have set out to accomplish when there emerged palpable anti-Jewish re-
sentment among the non-Jewish forced laborers left out of the agree-
ment.117 
The agreement to pay reparations to Jewish survivors, perhaps as 
well as the fact that non-Jewish survivors were not to be included, may 
also have sparked an incarnation of the old hatred. It could have been a 
coincidence, but within a month of the announced settlement, “there 
would be almost seven hundred reported cases of desecration of Jewish 
houses of worship and cemeteries in every state of the Federal Republic 
of Germany.”118 During this period, there were accounts of anti-Semitic 
incidents in “Vienna, Oslo, Antwerp, Brussels, East Berlin, Paris, Jo-
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hannesburg, Cape Town, Melbourne, London, [and] New York.”119 
There was eventually a small measure of ironic justice meted to 
Alfried Krupp. What constant Allied bombings and conviction at Nu-
remberg could not achieve, the hubris of his overconfidence would ac-
complish. A series of massive early-mid 1960s business deals in Com-
munist nations would prove to be a mistake destined to bring down his 
personal empire. 
Krupp’s financial success had been dependent upon financing from 
a Frankfurt firm owned by a large group of German banks.120 In order to 
finance its colossal speculations the company had been borrowing heav-
ily against its future. In 1966, 270 very nervous lending institutions 
learned that their most significant debtor would be unable to meet 
scheduled interest payments on these loans.121 The banks as well as the 
government were willing to provide assistance, but only on the condi-
tion that the Krupp corporate structure, including its ownership, was 
significantly changed.122 
In its August 11, 1967 issue, in an article entitled “End of the Dyn-
asty,”—almost exactly ten years to the day after Krupp had been praised 
on its cover—Time magazine reported that an agreement had “ordained 
the end of the house of Krupp.”123 By the end of that year, the corpora-
tion ceased to exist as a private company. Its assets and debts were 
transformed to a philanthropic foundation.124 Without Alfried Krupp, the 
company would manufacture elevator systems, automotive parts, bob-
sleds, protective glass panels for ice hockey rinks, fireworks, and even-
tually military submarines and warships for the government of Israel. . 
 
 119. Id.  
 120. JAMES, supra note 58, at 255. 
 121. Id. at 258–59. 
 122. Id. at 259. 
 123. Germany: End of the Dynasty, TIME (Aug. 11, 1967). 
 124. JAMES, supra note 58, at 260. Funding education, science, healthcare, sports and culture, 
rather than producing profits, would become its stated mission. Ironically, one of the men who 
would play a key role in arranging the transformation of the Krupp industries was Berthold Beitz, 
to whom Krupp had turned over much of the operations of his empire in 1953. FERENCZ, supra 
note 9, at 75. Alfried Krupp had wanted someone who “was 100% his man” and he had found 
him in Beitz.  JAMES, supra note 58, at 240. One of the arguably reprehensible things he had done 
for his employer had been negotiating the meager slave labor reparations settlement in 1959. 
However, he was also known for apparently having several hundred of Jewish workers and their 
families protected from deportation between 1941 and 1944 in the Boryslav region of what is 
now Ukraine. MANCHESTER, supra note 3, at 858, 827. As a result of his alleged time conduct, a 
humanitarian acts, World Jewish Congress President Ronald S. Lauder once praised as “one of 
the great Germans of the past century.” He would eventually spend the remainder of his life (until 
his death at age 99 in September 2013) running the reorganized Alfried Krupp Foundation. The 
company’s 21st century iteration of the industrial conglomerate (ThyssenKrupp AG) no longer 
directly produced armaments.  
GOLDMAN MACRO FINAL (CS).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/16/17  6:29 PM 
208 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 39:187 
Time brings on all revenges.125 The pressure had grown great. Lit-
tle more than a week before the publication of the Time Magazine arti-
cle reporting the end of the Krupp Empire, and when it was already 
clear that his company could no longer survive, the embittered, twice-
divorced, increasingly isolated and unrepentant fifty-nine-year-old was 
dead.126 Reportedly succumbing to a cancerous tumor, although there 
was a certain mystery surrounding the actual cause of death,127 the man 
who had come close to making Adolf Hitler ruler of the world died in 
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